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REAL PROPERTY: A SLAYER'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY
HELD JOINTLY WITH HIS VICTIM
It is abhorrent to the mind of every right-thinking person that
anyone should be permitted to benefit by wrongfully taking the life
of another.' Generally, a felonious slayer may not take benefit from
his victim's estate by will or heirship.2 However, in some states3 a
slayer is allowed to retain the entire property interest formerly held
in joint-tenancy with his victim, 4 although the artificial control of
survivorship is a material benefit to the slayer.
This is illustrated by a recent Kansas case; which approved a pro-
bate distribution allowing a slayer-husband to keep real property held
jointly with his victim-wife. The court stated that the husband took
nothing from the victim because his title vested at the time of the
original conveyance and, therefore, a statute saying that a felonious
slayer "shall not inherit or take by will or otherwise"6 from his vic-
1. Similar language is found frequently in cases, see, e.g., In re Foster's
Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 321, 320 P.2d 855, 860 (1958); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209
Mo. 621, 629, 108 S.W. 641, 642 (1908); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22
N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
That no one shall benefit from his own wrong was stated as an early common
law maxim. Broom, Legal Maxims 279 (7th ed. 1874).
2. Today, over twenty-five states have statutes specifically barring a slayer
from participating in his victim's estate, either by will or as an heir. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code Ann. § 636.47 (1950) (felonious taker of life); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-
119 (1956) (unlawful killer); Ohio Rev. Code § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1958) (first
or second degree murderer). Many other states bar the slayer by decision. See,
e.g., Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470 (1933); Perry v. Strawbridge,
209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889).
For discussion, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 477 (1955) (slaying of ancestor);
Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 960 (1954) (slaying of testator); Wade, Acquisition of
Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
715 (1936).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950) (joint
bank account); Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935) (joint
bank account); Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907) (ten-
ancy by entirety in real estate).
4. For the purpose of this article joint-tenancy and tenancy by the entirety
will not be distinguished. They are essentially alike. In both, title in the entire
property vests by the original conveyance. 2 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 418, 430
(3d ed., Jones 1939). Functionally there is no difference, because in each the
exclusive interest vests in the survivor. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp.
L.Q. 24, 35 (1951).
5. In re Foster's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d 855 (1958).
6. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-513 (1949). Such general statutory language,
following specific language preventing the taking by will or as heir, is usually
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tim was not applicable.7 The court admitted that the slayer benefited,
but felt a rule which would deprive the slayer of the victim's interest
in the joint-tenancy property should be declared by the legislature.8
These reasons and that the requested deprivation would be unlawful
under statutory or constitutional provisions which prohibit forfeiture
of property for conviction of a crime are typical reasons given by
courts when refusing to prevent a slayer's enrichment in jointly-
held property.
The better view imposes a constructive trust on the property in the
hands of the slayer for the benefit of the victim's heirs. This is the
position of the Restatement of Restitution10 and several cases."1 By
such a procedure the objections normally raised to the deprivation of
the wrongfully acquired property are minimized, if not extinguished.2
The constructive trust theory recognizes that the argument that the
slayer takes nothing additional by the killing is fallacious in that it
substitutes for reality a common law fiction of title, i.e., that joint-
tenants take title to the entire property by the original conveyance. 3
The substance of the relationship is that the slayer materially bene-
fitS1 4 by extinguishing the possibility of his title being defeated by
his predeceasing the co-tenant. By imposing a constructive trust on
held insufficient to cover the joint-tenancy situations. See, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 111.060 (1957) (or receive any interest as surviving spouse), Wenker v. Lan-
don, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-109 (1955) (take
. otherwise), Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
7. In re Foster's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 321, 320 P.2d 855, 860 (1958).
8. Id. at 322, 320 P.2d at 860. See also Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 438,
195 N.E. 838, 841 (1935); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 276, 88 P.2d 971,
975 (1939).
9. See Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950) ; Wenker v. Landon,
161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W.
108 (1907).
10. § 187 (1937).
11. See cases cited notes 22-23 infra.
A few states have specific statutes covering the disposition of joint interests.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.280 (Baldwin 1955) (forfeits all interest), Cowan v.
Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953) (only one-half of property to victim's
heirs); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 3445-46 (Supp. 1957) (one-half at slaying and
other half at death of slayer to victim's heirs); S.D. Code § 56.0505 (1939)
(same disposition as under the Pennsylvania statute).
12. This article does not discuss the problem of what degree of moral fault
should give rise to a finding of injustice in the enrichment. For discussion, see
Restatement, Restitution § 187 (1937); Wade, supra note 2, at 721-24.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. For a discussion of the amount of the benefit, see text supported by notes
22-26 infra.
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the legal title, unjust enrichment is prevented while the common law
concept of title is not overthrown.s
The courts that permit the slayer to retain the entire joint-tenancy
property usually consider the legislature as the body which should
establish the rule concerning the slayer's enrichment in the property. 0
The reason given is that control over distribution of decedents' estates
is within the strict province of the legislature. It is submitted that
this reason should not preclude a court from acting to prevent unjust
enrichment.'1 The joint-tenant relationship is more analogous to a
contract relationship than to the ancestor-heir or testator-devisee
relationships. In both the joint-tenancy situation and in an insurance
contract situation the rights of the parties are fixed by the written
instrument; the interests are not, therefore, regarded as within the
scope of the statutes of descent and distribution. Where an insured
is slain by the beneficiary under a life insurance contract the courts
have not hesitated to invoke, without the aid of a statute, a policy
preventing the slayer's enjoyment of the insurance proceeds.18 Thus,
it seems an argument that the policy concerning a joint-tenant slayer's
unjust enrichment must come, of necessity, from the legislature is
not valid.
The use of the constructive trust as a device for depriving a fe-
lonious slayer of the benefit resulting from his wrongful act, in addi-
tion, effectively prevents a possible violation of the prevalent pro-
visions against forfeiture of property for conviction."l Such pro-
visions are intended to guard against situations such as existed under
the English crown when a wrong to the state resulted in revocation
15. Legal title to the entire property remains in the slayer as trustee until
the slayer is removed from the position of being unjustly enriched. This can be
accomplished either by voluntary conveyance of the legal title, specific enforce-
ment of his duty to convey, or by such adequate legal remedies as tort or quasi-
contract actions. See 3 Scott, Trusts §§ 462.2-62.3 (1939).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. Cf. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 129-30, 80 A.2d 923, 927 (1951);
National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 715 (Ind. 1957).
18. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Cal. 1952);
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Weightman, 61 Okla. 106, 160 Pac. 629 (1916) ;
Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer when the Death of the Insured
is Caused by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee, 10 B.U.L. Rev. 281, 284 (1930).
Another similar situation is the relationships of holders of future interests
in the same property, i.e., reversioner-remainderman, remainderman-life tenant.
There are, however, only a few cases concerned with these problems. See Annot.,
24 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1952). But there is strong dictum in Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 343
Mo. 22, 28, 119 S.W.2d 810, 813 (1938), indicating.that title to land will not
revert to a murderer-reversioner from his remainderman-victim.
19. Most state constitutions have provisions against forfeiture of estate for
conviction. Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions of the United States. § 142
(1908). See Mo. Const. art. I, § 30 (1945).
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of the privilege of owning property.20 This purpose is not violated
when a constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment
because conviction is only a standard for finding injustice. 21 The
slayer retains legal title in the whole but is prevented from enjoying
the amount of his enrichment.
However, the cases are in disagreement on the quantity of interest
which should be placed under constructive trust for the victim's heirs.
The quantity has ranged from the value of the victim's life estate
(presuming the slayer's natural survival from a discrepancy in the
ages ) 2 2 to the whole interest. 23 It is submitted that the better view is
to place everything within the trust except an estate in one-half for
the life of the slayer, because during the existence of the joint-tenancy
the slayer had a right to one-half the profits for life and only a pos-
sibility that his interest would ripen into a fee interest in the whole.24
While it is true that actuaries are capable of making fairly accurate
estimates of relative survival chances,25 even if the actuarial chance
of the victim being the natural survivor were extremely slim, the
slayer would be unjustly enriched if given the benefit of that chance.
Thus, the slayer should be allowed to retain only a life estate in one-
half the beneficial interest. 6
What the Missouri courts would do in this situation is not certain.
Only two reported Missouri cases have considered the problem; the
cases involved bank deposits 27 and real property2 8 held in tenancy by
the entireties. Although in each a constructive trust was imposed for
only one-half the beneficial interest, this fact is not considered con-
clusive because in each case the plaintiff's prayer was limited to one-
20. See Comment, 17 Md. L. Rev. 45 (1957).
21. Id. at 58-59; Lore v. Habermeyer, 261 Wis. 266, 272, 58 N.W.2d 885, 888
(1952).
22. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J.Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933) (slayer four years
younger than the victim). But see Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345
(1952) (presumed natural survival of victim).
23. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (4th Dep't 1935);
In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 558, 212 N.Y.S. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925); Van
Alstyne v. Tuffy, 102 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
See also Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930) (one-half
the interest); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927) (all, except
a life interest in the slayer).
24. See note 4 supra.
25. Cf. Dublin & Lotka, The Money Value of a Man 134-35 (1946).
26. See Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951); Neiman v. Hurff,
11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188
(1927); Restatement, Restitution § 188 (1937); 3 Scott, Trusts § 493.2 (1939).
Contra, 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 478 (2d ed. 1946).
27. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
28. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948).
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half.2 9 The Missouri courts, without the benefit of a legislative decla-
ration of policy, state that because the slayer unjustly benefits from
the slaying, equitable principles enter and the common law fictions
of title give way to prevent the enjoyment of the benefit 0 The plain-
tiffs' arguments in the cases, of course, were limited by the prayer to
a showing that the unjust enrichment consisted of one-half the
property. It is submitted, however, for the reasons given previously,3'
that the unjust enrichment consisted of the entire interest excepting
an estate in one-half for the slayer's life.3 2 There is nothing within
the language of the Missouri cases to indicate that in a proper case
such an argument would not be approved by the Missouri courts.
Obviously, there is room for variances or differences among courts
concerning the moral issue of what types of conduct will cause en-
richment to be unjust.3 4 There also is room for differences on an-
cillary issues, such as the position of a slayer who commits suicide
before a trial is had on the factual issues.35 However, once it is de-
termined that any enrichment of a joint-tenant slayer would be un-
just, it should be found that the amount of the enrichment in the joint-
tenancy property consists of the entire property interest, excepting
an estate for the life of the slayer in one-half the beneficial interest.
29. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 877, 211 S.W.2d 464, 465 (1948); Barnett
v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 914, 27 S.W.2d 757, 758 (1930).
30. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 879, 211 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1948); Barnett
v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 917, 27 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1930).
31. See text supported by notes 24-26 supra.
32. Contra, Note, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 582, 588.
33. See Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 275, 88 P.2d 971, 975 (1939) ; accord
Note, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 582, 587-88; Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 582, 587-88 (1951-
52); Note, 13 Mo. L. Rev. 463, 464-66 (1948).
34. See note 12 supra.
35. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 723 (1936), for a discussion of the
problem.
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